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Webster and Women's Equalityt
Dawn Johnsen*
Marcy J. Wilder**

The National Abortion Rights Action League (NARAL) and the
Women's Legal Defense Fund (WLDF) co-authored an amicus curiae
brief submitted to the United States Supreme Court in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services.' The brief was authored on behalf of seventyseven organizations committed to women's equality. The brief argued
that continued constitutional protection of a woman's fundamental
right to choose abortion is guaranteed by the liberty-based right to privacy. Further, we argued that this right is essential to women's ability
to achieve sexual equality. In order to participate in society as equals,
women must be afforded the opportunity to make decisions concerning
childbearing. Women's unique reproductive capabilities have long
served as a principal justification for their unequal and disadvantageous
treatment by the state. Restrictive abortion laws continue "our Nation['s] .. .long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination" 2 by depriving women of the freedom to control the course of their lives.
The brief described ways in which foreclosing the abortion option
severely restricts women's ability to participate in society equally with
men. The brief also detailed the profound negative impact on women's
lives that would result if the Court found a compelling state interest in
protecting potential life prior to viability. We argued that such a holding would permit states to curtail the freedom of pregnant women drastically, and would thereby vitiate the constitutional right to liberty for
all women. The following is an overview of the principal legal arguments set forth in the NARAL/WLDF brief.
If the United States Supreme Court were to uphold abortion restrictions that force pregnant women to bear children, it would render
empty the constitutional promise of liberty for women by profoundly
structuring their lives. Moreover, it would do so for women alone; men
t [his is a summary of the "Brief of Seventy-Seven Organizations Committed to
Women's Equality as Anici Curiae in Support of Appellees." This brief may be found at
Congressional Information Service Microfiche, United States Supreme Court Records and
Briefs, Il'ebster v. Reproductive Hlealth
Senlices, Card No. 35.
*J.D., 1986, Yale Law School. Legal Director of the National Abortion Rights Action
League (NARAL), Washington, D.C.
**J.D., 1988, Stanford Law School. Stafitattorney at NARAL.
1 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
2 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973).
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are not required to endure comparable burdens in the service of the
state's abstract interest in promoting life. To ensure that the constitutional guarantee of liberty "extends to women as well as to men," the
Supreme Court must secure women's right to choose abortion lest it
"protect inadequately a central part of the sphere of liberty that our law
guarantees equally to all." 3
State interference with abortion violates the principle of bodily integrity that underlies much of the fourteenth amendment's promise of
liberty. The process of bearing a child involves the most intimate and
strenuous exercises of the female body and psyche; forced continued
pregnancy entails a tangible violation of physical liberty by subjecting
women to a host of physical burdens and risks that range from prolonged discomfort and pain during pregnancy and delivery, to a substantial risk of specific medical complications, and even death. State'
abortion restrictions thus require women - and women only - to
endure physical intrusions and risks that are greater than those previously found by the Supreme Court to violate the constitutional principle of bodily integrity. The principles underlying the Supreme Court's
treatment of state-mandated bodily intrusions demonstrate that forced
childbearing visits unacceptable violations upon women's bodily
integrity.
For example, in Winston v. Lee, 4 the Court held that, in part because
of "the extent of [its] intrusion upon the individual's dignitary interest
in personal privacy and bodily integrity,"-5 a state could not, consistent
with the fourth amendment, compel a criminal defendant to submit to
an invasive surgical operation in order to retrieve a bullet necessary for
the state's prosecution. The Court found that the criminal defendant's
right to bodily integrity would be violated by the state's imposition of
the risks inherent in a surgical procedure consisting of a small incision
in his skin and retrieval of the bullet. By comparison, one in four pregnant women delivers by cesarean section, which requires a much larger
incision in the woman's abdomen, and is accompanied by all the risks,
pain and permanent disfigurement associated with invasive surgery.
In Rochin v. California,6 the Supreme Court overturned a conviction
based on evidence obtained from a "shocking" bodily invasion consisting of the forced stomach pumping of a criminal suspect. 7 The pain
and discomfort associated with having one's stomach pumped is comparable to the physical effects of pregnancy, including morning sick3 Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 772
(1986).
'1470 U.S. 753 (1985).
5 Id. at 761.
6342 U.S. 165 (1952).
7 Id. at 172.
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ness, which is experienced by many pregnant women on a recurring
basis. Given that isolated aspects of pregnancy involve risks and burdens comparable to or worse than those found unacceptable when imposed upon criminal defendants, forced pregnancy and childbirth
certainly constitute an intolerable bodily intrusion when imposed by
the state on unwilling pregnant women.
At some time in their lives, most women willingly choose to bear
and raise children. Few events, however, can more dramatically constrain a woman's opportunities in life than an unplanned child. The
bearing and raising of children often places severe constraints on women's employment opportunities and therefore threatens their ability
to support themselves and their families. Moreover, teenagers' inability to postpone motherhood until they have completed a basic education and are psychologically and financially equipped to care for
children largely predetermines the paths their lives will take before they
have even developed their own identities and aspirations. Teenage
mothers, for example, receive lower hourly wages and earn less annu8
ally for the rest of their lives than women who postpone childbearing.
Even for many women who become pregnant after their teens, opportunities in the public world are severely constrained. Many women
lose their employment during pregnancy because employers unlawfully
discriminate against them or do not adapt their jobs either to fetal
hazards or to the perceived physical constraints of pregnancy; many
other women lose their jobs or suffer significant financial hardships because employers do not provide or do not pay for job-protected leave
for childbearing or infant care. Some women must either accept parttime work with significantly less pay, and few if any job benefits, or
move to less skilled positions so that they can work a regular schedule.
If the Supreme Court were to overrule Roe v. Wade, 9 thereby depriving women of the right to control the frequency and timing of their
pregnancies, it would deny women the ability to plan and shape their
futures and assume their place in the public world.
Missouri and the Solicitor General of the United States have asked
the Supreme Court to relabel the state's interest in protecting potential
life as compelling, prior to viability, so as to override a woman's right to
choose abortion at all times. This extraordinary request is based solely
on the assertion that viability provides an unworkable dividing line.
Current medical evidence reveals that this critique is unfounded. But
even were the critique acceptable, the conclusion that the state's interest is always compelling would not logically follow; the unworkability of
8 RISKING rHE FUTURE:

Hayes ed. 1987).
')410 U.S. 113 (1973).

ADOLESCENT SEXUALITY, PREGNANCY, AND CHILDBEARING
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viability as a dividing line would equally support the opposite conclusion: that the state's interest in protecting potential life is never sufficiently compelling to outweigh a woman's fundamental right to choose
abortion. Hence, the critique of viability merely begs the central question of how to evaluate the state's asserted interest in the context of
abortion restrictions.
The Supreme Court has never accepted as compelling an asserted
interest so broad that it would eliminate virtually all constitutional protection afforded a fundamental right. Were the Supreme Court to accept Missouri's blanket contention that its interest in potential life
outweighs women's fundamental right to procreative autonomy at all
stages of pregnancy, states would be free to criminalize abortion in
virtually all circumstances, to investigate all abortions to determine
whether they were spontaneous or intentionally induced, and then to
prosecute for murder women who intentionally ended their
pregnancies.
Missouri's reasoning would allow states to criminalize the use of
any contraceptive devices, such as intrauterine devices and some oral
contraceptives, that prevent implantation of a fertilized ovum after conception. More fundamentally, because the "potentiality" of life exists
equally before sperm-ovum fusion as after, states could invoke the
same "compelling" interest proffered here to justify laws prohibiting
the use or sale of all contraceptives. At bottom, embracing the position
advocated by Missouri would not only require the reversal of Roe, but
would call into question Griswold v. Connecticut 10 and Eisenstadt v. Baird''
as well.
Moreover, embracing Missouri's position would provide states
with an open-ended invitation to force pregnant women to act in
whatever ways the state determined were optimal for the.fetus, thereby
reducing pregnant women to no more than fetal containers. A frightening preview of the potential intrusions is found in Missouri Revised
Statute section 1.205 itself (part of which is at issue here), which states
that "[t]he life of each human being begins at conception" and
"[u]nborn children have protectable interests in life, health and wellbeing." 12 A Missouri court relied on section 1.205 in ordering a pregnant woman to submit to a cesarean section against her wishes, finding
that "the life, health, and well-being" of her fetus "may be jeopardized" by her decision."
If the Supreme Court accepts a compelling state interest in the fe10381 U.S. 479 (1965).
'1 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
§ 188.205 (1988).
13 Deaconess Hosp. v. McRoberts, No. 874-00172 (St. Louis, Mo., Cir. Ct. May 21, 1987).
12 Mo. REV. STAT.
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tus from conception, laws like section 1.205 could be used to force women to submit not only to cesarean sections, but also to other types of
surgery and medical treatment deemed to be in the interest of the fetus
they carry, including in utero fetal surgery. Pregnant women could be
denied medical care needed to protect their own health, such as radiation or chemotherapy to treat cancer, or the use of prescription or nonprescription drugs. A wide range of common conditions and conduct
arguably posing some threat to fetal health could provoke state intervention, criminal prosecution or civil liability, including: being overweight, being underweight, exercising, not exercising, failing to eat
"well," failing to "stay off of her feet," smoking, drinking alcohol, ingesting caffeine and suffering physical harm. In short, acceptance of
Missouri's assertion of a broad compelling interest in protecting potential life would do far more than eviscerate the fundamental right to
abortion. It would also provide the constitutional foundation for a
frontal assault on other fundamental liberties.
Missouri's decision to advance its interest through pre-viability
abortion restrictions must also be rejected because it entails the resurrection of "archaic and overbroad generalizations" about women's
proper role in society. 14 For many years the Supreme Court accepted
detrimental treatment as the "natural" consequence of women's reproductive capacities and as furthering important state interests, such as
"preserv[ing] the strength and vigor of the race." 5 The Court has now
soundly rejected the outmoded view that "the female [is] destined
solely for the home and the rearing of the family,"' 16 and it has invalidated legislation that perpetuates women's image as the " 'weaker sex'
or ... child rearers. ' ' 17 Despite the likely absence of malicious intentions and the widespread acceptance (even among women) of unequal
treatment, the Court has recognized that the Constitution prohibits the
state from disadvantaging any individual woman on the basis of stereotypes. Abortion restrictions reflect and reinforce the same stereotypes
of women that the Court has found illegitimate. By requiring women to
sacrifice their bodies and their liberty in ways that the state never demands of men, state laws manifest the stereotype that it is women's
"natural role" to bear children.
Although Missouri asserts an interest in compelling unwilling women to sacrifice their bodies, health and well-being for nine months to
protect potential life, Missouri and other states never impose comparable duties on men to protect actual life. The value that our law attaches
14 Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317 (1977) (per curiam) (quoting Schlesinger v.
Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975)).
15 Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421 (1908).
16Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14 (1975).
17 Califano, 430 U.S. at 317.
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to the individual right to liberty is so great that people are generally not
required to reach out to aid another person, even when it is possible to
save another from grave injury or certain death at little or no risk to
oneself. Particularly instructive is McFall v. Shimp,' 8 in which a court
refused to order a-man to donate bone marrow, a procedure far less
risky than many aspects of pregnancy and childbirth, even though the
donation was necessary to save the life of his cousin. According to the
court:
The common law has consistently held to a rule which provides that one human being is under no legal compulsion to
give aid to take action to save 'that human being or to rescue .... For our law to compel the Defendant to submit to an
intrusion of his body would change every concept and principle upon which our society is founded. To do so would defeat
the sanctity of the individual .... and one could not imagine
where the line would be drawn.' 9
To permit the state's interest in potential life to prevail over women's fundamental rights would have the perverse effect of elevating
fetuses to "superhuman" status by giving fetuses protections that states
do not give to persons. This provides further evidence that this legislative "trade-off" rests upon an illegitimate stereotype that women are
essentially, and "naturally," childbearers, and that women are therefore
appropriate targets for a subordination of bodily freedom and autonomy that never has been and never would be placed in comparable
fashion upon men.
The Supreme Court is asked to view the state's interest in protecting potential life as so compelling that it eviscerates women's fundamental right to reproductive choice throughout pregnancy. The Court
in Roe understood and discharged its responsibility to protect fundamental rights from undue government interference by allowing women's right and the, state's interest to supersede each other at different
temporal states of pregnancy. Retreating today from this commitment
to the safeguarding of fundamental rights would cede complete control
over women's (and only women's) reproductive autonomy (and hence a
core aspect of their social, economic and political freedom) to a political process that frequently has failed to treat women fairly; particularly
given the highly-charged emotional environment in which legislative
"balances" necessarily would be struck, legislatures can be expected
again to undervalue both the importance of protecting women's autonomy and the burdens of state-imposed continued pregnancy and childbirth. Allowing state legislatures to dictate women's most intimate and
10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90 (Allegheny County 1978) (per curiam).

'"Id. at 91 (emphasis in original).

